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STOP AND FRISK OR ARREST AND SEARCH-THE USE
AND MISUSE OF EUPHEMISMS
(Comments upon The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us,
by Professor Herbert L. Packer)
THEODORE SOURIS*
"Ways and means will be suggested for resolving
the conflict that now seems to exist between the
interests of individual civil liberties and the in-
terests of effective law enforcement." So announces
the program for this Conference. Professor Packer,
in his presentation today, has suggested that such
a conflict does not actually exist; that the recent
Supreme Court decisions, particularly with regard
to confessions, represent an historical trend within
the Court to pay that regard to an individual's
liberty which once was paid only to an individual's
property;- and that those decisions, while they fre-
quently and emotionally have been denounced as a
death blow to effective law enforcement,2 will, in
the long run, be no more so than was the decision
to exclude confessions obtained by physical tor-
ture. My agreement upon these points is complete.
Today I shall explore one proposal currently
being advanced by some in our midst and which
others among us abhor, but which all thoughtful
citizens must concede presents a conflict between
individual liberty and effective police procedures.
The proposal of which I speak is that euphe-
mistically labeled "stop and frisk". I plan first to
note briefly current police practices of field in-
terrogations and searches. Then I shall discuss the
* Justice of the Supreme Court of Michigan.
I The first provision of the Bill of Rights to be held
applicable to the states was the fifth amendment's
prohibition against taking private property for public
use without just compensation. Chicago B. & Q. R.
Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U,S. 226 (1897).2In a recent discussion of court decisions concerning
criminal law we find the following statements:
"We cannot have 'domestic tranquility' and 'pro-
mote the general welfare' as prescribed in the Preamble
to the Constitution when all the concern is upon 'in-
dividual civil liberties.'...
"In our efforts to preserve individual civil liberties,
we cannot abolish the police and other law enforcement
agencies and still survive as an orderly society. Nor
can we impose so many restrictions upon them that
they will be practically powerless to prevent crime
and apprehend criminals...." Inbau, Law Enzforce-
ment, the Courts, and Individual Civil Liberties in Cama-
NA!. JUsTIcE IN Ou T= 134-135 (1965).
most recent proposal for legitimatizing, in only
scantly modified form, these existing procedures-
the first Tentative Draft of the American Law
Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Pro-
cedure. In examining the draft, I shall give some
consideration to the argument that stop and frisk
authority is essential to the functioning of the
police. Primary emphasis, however, will be placed
upon an analysis of the legal basis advanced by the
draftsmen in support of the proposed model code,
so that a judgment may be made whether the pro-
posals of the code realistically can be expected to
pass muster with recent United States Supreme
Court decisions and the underlying principles
thereof.
I.
What actually occurs, typically, today when the
police stop a person on the street in suspicious
circumstances less than sufficient to justify legally
an arrest? For our answer, several sources, in addi-
tion, perhaps, to our own experiences, may be
examined. First, from Detroit, we-have available
the published observations of a highly respected
and skilled reporter, Mr. John Millhone, chief
editorial writer for The Detroit Free Press, who
recently described an evening spent in a police
patrol car thusly:
It was nearly midnight and I didn't see the
dark figure scurrying across the boulevard in
front of us until the police sergeant asked:
"Why's he running?"
We were cruising west on Boston Blvd. near
Woodward-an area tormented by break-ins
and strong-arm robberies--so it wasn't an
idle question.
The sergeant accelerated the blue and white
Tactical Mobile Unit ahead to the corner and
back on the other side of the boulevard where
the man was scurrying along the sidewalk.
"Hold on there," the officer ordered. The
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figure stopped. The two sergeants and a
curious editorial writer climbed out of the
TMU.
The figure was a Negro youth who gave his
name, his age (17) and his address (some 12
blocks away on the west side of the Lodge
Freeway). He said he had been to a party,
was supposed to be home by midnight and was
running to get there.
He tried to look unemotional, but he was
scared. Beads of perspiration started forming
on his forehead and his hands shook.
He didn't have any identification, he said,
but when the sergeant patted him down he
found a billfold in a hip pocket. The billfold
was almost empty except for a draft card. The
age on the card was crudely altered and it gave
a different name from that given by the youth.
"Where'd you get this?" the officer asked.
"I found it in the street."
"What have you got in your pocket?"
The youth took his hand out of his coat
pocket and the policeman fished inside and
pulled out the head of a mason's hammer-
one with a sharp wedge where most hammers
have claws.
"Where'd you get this?"
"I made it in shop class at Northwestern
(High School). I had it earlier.., just left it in
my pocket."
Off to one side, one of the sergeants demon-
strated the hammerhead's usefulness as a
weapon. How, clenched in your fist, it would
be like a horseshoe in a boxer's glove and how
the sharp wedge, jutting down from your fist,
was like a small ax.
There were more questions.
"Why are you so nervous?"
"I'm just cold."
The youth was frisked more thoroughly.
Identification was found in his inside coat poc-
ket. He had "forgotten" it was there.
After 10 minutes of this, the two policemen
advised him to get rid of his false identifica-
tion, leave the hammerhead at home and then
they let him go.
There was no law they could hold him
under. The billfold-it would be hard to shake
his story. Carrying a concealed weapon-
hardly. Obstructing a police officer-not
likely.
In fact, there was little reason not to believe
the youth's story.
As we got back into the TMU, the police
sergeant commented casually: "That was a
'stop and frisk.' 3
That such practices are not confined to the City
of Detroit is shown by this recent description of
activities in Chicago:
... Most of the Task Force on a typical
night is working random stop-and-quiz mis-
sions in high-crime districts. A car with a tail
light out gives the police an excuse to stop and
question the driver; they find a .32-caliber re-
volver in the glove compartment. A motorist
looks as i [f] he 'just doesn't fit' the expensive
car he's driving; they've recovered another
stolen auto.
By conducting more than a quarter million
such 'field interrogations' in the course of a
year, the Task Force will find more than a
thousand illegal guns, recover seven hundred
stolen autos, and make almost eight thousand
arrests. Those concerned with civil liberties
argue that despite these results, the Task
Force stop-and-quiz operation skirts the thin
edge of police harassment. Wilson replies by
saying, 'Law enforcement necessarily restricts
the liberty and freedom of movement of those
persons who, by engaging in criminal activity,
interfere with the rights of others.' Translated,
this means that only criminals have to worry
about harassment. 4
Unfortunately, it is not at all true that only
those engaged in criminal activity need worry
about police harassment. An instance comes to
mind from my own city of Detroit. An eminent
jurist, a Negro, was stopped by a police officer
allegedly for having made a "rolling stop" while
driving home at night after visiting his fiancee in a
fashionable residential neighborhood. The judge,
at the police officer's request, handed over his
driver's license and automobile registration and in-
formed the officer that he had been visiting a friend
in the neighborhood. However, he refused to
identify his fiancee and was thereupon taken to
$The Detroit Free Press, January 9, 1966, §B, p. 2.
While frisking apparently occurred in this incident,
there was, as well, a search, even as defined by the
draftsmen, as a sequela of the frisk, a consequence I
believe we are entitled to assume almost always follows
frisking.
4The Reporter, March 24, 1966, p 31. The interro-
gation and frisking of mere suspects in the field, at
least as of several years ago was "a fairly common
practice in Kansas, Michigan and Wisconsin, especially
at night", we are told by Professor LaFave. See
LAFAvE, ARREsT 344-347 (1965).
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police headquarters where he was immediately
recognized by the lieutenant on duty and released
with appropriate apologies. 5 That judge's experi-
ence, except for the apology, is not unique even in
my own city of Detroit.
If such events as this do happen in Detroit,
which since 1943 has had an enviable record in race
relations and which has escaped the riots which
have wracked every other major city of this coun-
try, and if such events do happen to individuals
who possess every indicia of clean-shaven middle-
class respectability except that of skin color, what
must be the treatment accorded to the ordinary,
law-abiding Negro in less "enlightened" cities?
As Professor Packer observed today: "This atti-
tude [that the police are suspect] will not be
changed by words. It will take deeds."' The field
interrogations and searches which occur today are
deeds; judicial sanction of stop and frisk also is a
deed, and can be expected to influence our citizens'
attitudes toward the police, but hardly in the direc-
tion of increasing respect for and trust in them.
II.
A.
As has been noted supra, police now are, and
have been, utilizing field interrogation and search
techniques in their efforts to combat crime. It is
only in the past several years, however, that these
practices have received the attention they deserve
in view of the important constitutional issues
raised by them. Unfortunately, with increasing
frequency our thoughtful attention has been di-
verted from the constitutional issues involved by
the discordant sounds of verbal combat from two
warring camps of usually reasonable citizens. The
shrill, near-hysterical pitch of the sounds of battle
affirms the fear that both forces have taken leave
of reason. One of the warring camps accuses police
and prosecuting authorities of blatant disregard
of our land's law in their ruthless pursuit of crimi-
nals and, as well, of contempt for the rights of
others, particularly the Negro, in the performance
of their duties. The other warring camp, not con-
tent simply to defend the police and prosecutors on
the basis of their records of performance, has
launched an offensive aimed at federal and state
appellate courts for placing "judicial handcuffs"
on law enforcement officers. It is against this dis-
turbing background that the draftsmen of the
6 The Detroit Free Press, June 17, 1964, §A, p 1.6 Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us,
57 J. Cans. L., C. & P.S. 238, 241 (1966).
ALI's proposed Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure advocate placing an imprimatur of
legality upon stop and frisk practices.
The tentative draft of the code authorizes an
officer to stop persons in "suspicious circum-
stances", and to detain them for 20 minutes, during
which time they may be questioned and searched
or, as defined by the draftsmen's commentary ac-
companying the proposal, frisked, for dangerous
weapons. The officer is further authorized to use
reasonable force, less than deadly, to obtain these
objectives. 7
The Note and Commentary on §2.02 try to dis-
tinguish between an arrest and the "authority to
detain briefly" authorized by §2.02. The reasoning
of the draftsmen is that, before a valid arrest can
be made for a crime not committed in the officer's
presence, the officer must have reasonable cause to
believe that the person arrested has committed or
is committing a felony; but a brief detention is not
an arrest, so it is argued, and, therefore, may
validly be made upon grounds of mere suspicion
which would not authorize an arrest.
I submit that the draftsmen are toying with
words when they say that a "brief detention" for
purposes of interrogation and with the right to
search is not an arrest, and that they are doing so
in a patent attempt to circumvent the presently
well-established and familiar judicial standards by
which it is determined whether an arrest has oc-
curred. They say:
Detention under this section is not called an
arrest, since in the draft "arrest" is used in the
conventional sense to authorize the far more
onerous interference of removal to a police sta-
tion and eventually to court.
They then continue:
But, inasmuch as this section authorizes a
"seizure" of the person, it must be reasonable
if it is to satisfy the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.
So here in essence is how the draftsmen have
argued:
To make a valid arrest without a warrant for a
crime not committed in the officer's presence, the
officer must have reasonable cause to believe that
the person arrested has committed or is com-
mitting a felony because under the fourth amend-
ment an arrest is a seizure of the person. Since in
the stop and frisk situation the officer does not have




frisk -were an arrest it would be prohibited by the
fourth amendment. To avoid the stultifying effect
of that amendment, we hereby define a stop and
frisk so-that it is something other than an arrest.
Therefore, court decisions requiring reasonable
cause for an arrest have no application to a stop
and frisk, even though a stop and frisk is a seizure
which must be reasonable if it is to satisfy the re-
quirements of the fourth amendment.8
It is rather disturbing, to say the least, that a
distinguished group of lawyers should embark
upon a course of semantic gymnastics in order to
justify that which they should know cannot be
justified under existing judicial precedent. Both a
"conventional arrest" and a "brief detention" are
seizures, they say, which must be reasonable to
comply with the strictures of the fourth amend-
ment but, for some unexplained reason, those stric-
tures are less strict when the seizure of the person
is by means of "brief detention" than when the
seizure is by means of "conventional arrest".
Perhaps "unexplained" is unfair to the drafts-
men. When we turn to the Commentary on §2.02,
we find this illuminating statement concerning
possible constitutional objections to stop and frisk:
It might, of course, still be argued that the
power granted in this section is, in principle,
unreasonable, and therefore violative of the
Fourth Amendment. This constitutional ob-
jecti6n can best be met by an exposition of the
effect and purposes of the provision and the
need for it. If the case for such a provision is a
convincing one, it would seem to follow that
the provision should not be-condemned as un-
reasonable. (pp 94-95.)
While such a statement would not have been sur-
prising had it come from the pen of Lewis Carroll,
it is somewhat disconcerting to -find it in a draft
of a pre-arraignment code which is to be presented
to the American Law Institute for its approval.
8 One is reminded of the colloquy between Alice and
Humpty Dumpty:
"'I don't know what you mean by "glory", Alice
said.
"Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. 'Of
course you don't-till I tell you. I meant "there's a
nice knock-down argument for you."'
"'But "glory" doesn't mean "a nice knock-down
argument" ', Alice objected.
"'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in
rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it
to mean-neither more nor less.'
"'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can
make words mean so many different things."' CAR-
ROLL, THmouGH Tam LooKING GLAss, ch. 6.
Indeed, that is the question.
Seldom has it been put more bluntly that the end
justifies the means. The draftsmen here tell us that
constitutional objections that a stop and frisk
without reasonable cause is violative of the fourth
amendment may be met, not by demonstrating on
the contrary that such a procedure is counten-
anced by the fourth amendment but, instead, by
demonstrating that the officially bestowed power
to stop and frisk allegedly would make the task of
law enforcement easier.
Logical extrapolations of such a novel constitu-
tional doctrine are somewhat disquieting. For ex-
ample, it would justify overturning the Mapp9 ex-
clusionary rule. For while constitutional obstacles
have been raised to admission of evidence seized in
a search not based upon probable cause, certainly
such evidence is trustworthy, and, it might be
argued, should be admissible in evidence because
the right or power to do so is "indispensable in a
rational scheme of police activity".?
Rather than elaborating on the ramifications of
the "good end justifies means which, were it not
for the good end, would be unconstitutional" argu-
ment, let us consider briefly the draftsmen's argu-
ment that stop and frisk authority is "indispens-
able in a rational scheme of police activity".
One might begin by noting that this certainly is
not the first time that a particular police practice,
when assailed as violative of constitutional guaran-
tees, has been defended on the gound that it is in-
dispensable to effective law enforcement. That
argument was made in the Escobedo case,' the
meaning of which, as I read it, is that a suspect in
police custody, before he is questioned for the pur-
pose of obtaining a confession from him, must be
accorded the absolute right to remain silent and to
consult with counselj
2
We have been told, without reference to any
authority but only by reference to hypothetical
criminal situations, that "The only course open to
the police in the overwhelming majority of these
cases [of robbery, rape and others of a similar
nature] is to look for probable suspects and ques-
tion them as to their possible guilt." 3 And we have
been told that in Escobedo the reason the police re-
fused to permit the defendant's lawyer to see him
before they had finished questioning him and ob-
9 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10 §2.02, p 95.
1 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
12 See People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d
361 (1965).
11 Inbau, op. cit. supra note 2 at 100.
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tainig his confession was because "the standard
advice lawyers give to their clients in such situa-
tions is 'Keep your mouth shut.' "14 The whole
tenor of the article from which these quotations are
taken is that if persons in custody are told of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to consult
an attorney, or, even worse, if they actually are per-
mitted to talk to a devilish advocate, whole hordes
of robbers and rapists will swarm through the land
undetected.
Now as I noted, these ad homimes were un-
supported by any studies made regarding the es-
sentiallity of confessions in criminal prosecutions.
As Professor Packer has noted, such studies have
been made. I should like to refer to the report com-
piled by Chief of Detectives Vincent W. Piersante
of the Detroit Police Department mentioned by
Professor Packer. Chief Piersante compiled statis-
tics of confessions and their use by several sp-
cialized bureaus of the Detroit Police Department
for the year 1961 and for a nine-month period in
1965, that period commencing upon the date
when the department began effective notification
of criminal suspects of their absolute right to re-
main silent and their right to legal counsel.'5
1
4 Id. at 107.
25 On January 20, 1965, the following letter was sent
to all commanding officers in the criminal investiga-
tion division:
"In view of the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in the Case of Escobedo vs Illinois, which re-
versed a conviction on a murder charge by declaring a
confession inadmissible, and then proceeded to set
some definite guidelines for prisoner interrogation,
the following is submitted as a procedure which we will
follow:
"When an investigation is no longer a general in-
quiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus
on a particular suspect and the suspect has been taken
into police custody, he must be effectively warned of
his absolute constitutional right to remain silent. In
addition, he must be provided with an opportunity to
consult with his lawyer if he so requests.
"The following statement will be made by inter-
rogating officers to the suspect at the beginning of the
questioning: 'I am Detective (the officer should state
his name), and I wish to advise you that you have a
constitutional right to refuse to make any statement.
You do not have to answer any questions which are
put to you, and anything you do say may be used
against you in a Court of Law in the event of prose-
cution. You are further advised that you have a right
to counsel.'
"This notification of constitutional rights will be
noted in the remarks section of the interrogation sheet,
or some other appropriate place. It is also suggested
that the suspect be requested to sign this section of the
interrogation sheet, as fulther proof of the fact that
he was informed of his rights under the Law. (A sepa-
rate form to be signed by the suspect is being con-
sidered and may be issued in the near future.)
"Certain statements by suspects are still admissible
Officers involved in the cases were interviewed and
the files were reviewed to determine in what per-
centage of the prosecutions confessions were essen-
tial.
In robberies, in 1961, confessions were obtained
in 81.8% of the cases, and they were deemed essen-
tial in 26% of the cases; in 1965, confessions were
obtained in 83% of the cases and deemed essential
in 29%. In forcible rapes, in 1961, confessions were
obtained in 24.3% of the cases, and in 1965, in 19,%
of the cases; none of the confessions was deemed
essential, because it is the policy of the department
not to issue warrants in such cases upon the basis
of a confession without extrinsic evidentiary sup-
port. Lumping all categories of crime surveyed, we
find that in 1961 confessions were obtained in
60.8% of the cases, and were deemed essential in
13.1% of the cases; in 1965, confessions were ob-
tained in 58.% of the cases, but were deemed essen-.
tial in only 11.3% of the cases1 ,
What, then, were the results of "stripping the.
police of essential investigative procedures"' 7 by
requiring, in the spirit of Escobedo, that suspects
be informed of their rights to remain silent and to
counsel? At the very least, improved police effi-
ciency, as evidenced by the fact that reliance upon
confessions, as the basis for convictions, decreased.
Moreover, except in one category, burglary, there
was no significant decrease in the number of con-
fessions obtained after the department began effec-
tively to notify prisoners of their rights, and in that
category the decrease in the number of confessions
obtained was more than offset by a greater decrease
in the number of cases in which confessions were
deemed essential, this fact attributable, no doubt,
to a rising level of efficiency and competency among
the officers of the department.
If, then, the power to question a suspect without
advising him of his rights to remain silent and to
counsel has not proved indispensable to a rational
system of justice, what basis have we for assuming
that the granted power forcibly to detain citizens
without the prescribed notification of their constitu-
tional rights. These include 'threshold' statements
which take place at the time of arrest and while the
suspect is being transported to the Station. Thus it is
imperative that arresting officers and officers at the
scene of a crime make very specific and detailed re-
ports of their actions and conversations with suspects
prior to turning them over to Detectives for final in-
vestigation."
Because of its factual pertinency, the complete
chart is included as an appendix.
17 Inbau, op. cit. supra note 2 at 117.
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upon mere suspicion is indispensable? The drafts-
men of the code say this in the commentary:
It has been argued by some that in all such
cases, where reasonable cause for an arrest
does not exist, the police must rely on volun-
tary cooperation to achieve their purposes,
and if they cannot, it is only because society is
reluctant to go to the trouble and expense of
hiring more and better police. But this argu-
ment disposes too easily of the case for a
power to stop. No police force can be large
enough to allow officers to follow and observe
every suspicious person they encounter. (p 96.)
Once again the draftsmen have overstated the
problem and have reached a conclusion based
upon an unvoiced assumption of questionable
validity. They say, "No police force can be large
enough to allow officers to follow and observe every
suspicious person they encounter". Granted,
arquendo. But this presupposes that none of the
suspicious persons encountered, and who the police
question, will cooperate voluntarily with the police.
Yet in the Note on §2.01, Voluntary Cooperation
with Law Enforcement Officers, the draftsmen note
that "many persons accord inherent respect"'8 to
a request for cooperation from a law enforcement
officer. And they are right, as is demonstrated by
the number of confessions obtained even from those
who are informed of their rights to remain silent
and to counsel. It is not, then, a case of the police
having to follow every suspicious person they see.
Some, probably most, will be innocent of wrong-
doing and will respond to questioning without
coercion.
But let us assume that §2.02 becomes the law.
What will it accomplish? I think we can agree that
presently most people asked questions by the police
on the street respond voluntarily. Section 2.02 is
designed to permit an officer to compel by force a
suspicious person to remain in his presence who
otherwise would not. Once having this unwilling
suspect in custody, what may the officer do? He
may, during a period not to exceed 20 minutes, ob-
tain the suspect's identification and verify it. The
officer also may request the suspect's cooperation
but, as the Note warns, "an officer is forbidden
falsely to imply an obligation to cooperate with
him, and ... where the officer engages in sustained
questioning, he must warn such person that there
is no obligation to respond." (p 9.) Finally, he may
search the suspect to the extent necessary to dis-
18Note on §2.01, p 5.
cover dangerous weapons if he reasonably believes
his safety so requires.
What, then, do we gain from a person who
otherwise would not voluntarily cooperate? His
identification. What price do we pay? We grant
the police a power, unprecedented in our republic,
to take into custody and question and search on
bare suspicion not rising to the dignity of probable
cause, citizens lawfully going about their private
affairs. 19 There can be no doubt who would bear
the brunt of this new power; it would be those
members of our cities' minority groups-those
citizens who frequently are excoriated for holding
in contempt the processes of a legal system which
traditionally has treated them with contempt if not
outright abuse. The eloquent statement by Chief
Judge Bazelon of the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia bears repetition:
So the issue really comes down to whether
we should further whittle away the protections
of the very people who most need them-the
people who are too ignorant, too poor, too ill-
educated to defend themselves. Can we expect
to induce a spirit of respect for law in the
people who constitute our crime problem by
treating them as beyond the pale of the Con-
stitution? Though the direct effect of restrict-
ing constitutional guarantees would at first
be limited to these people, indirectly and even-
tually we should all be affected. Initially the
tentacles of incipient totalitarianism seize only
the scapegoats of society, but over time they
may weaken the moral fibre of society to the
point where none of us will remain secure.'0
Thus, I think the draftsmen abdicated their re-
sponsibility when they accepted uncritically the
proposition that an absolute power to stop and
question suspicious citizens is indispensable to a
rational scheme of law enforcement. Having dis-
cussed the speciousness of disposing of the consti-
tutionality of such a procedure by deciding whether
there is a need for it, let me now turn to the drafts-
men's cursory discussion of the case law on this
subject.
19 An aversion to searches based upon suspicion is
not new to this country. One of the most damning
charges that James Otis leveled agaist the odious
writs of assistance in 1761 was that they permitted an
officer to search upon "Bare suspicion without
oath...." Documents of American History 46 (Com-
mager ed. 1958).
2o Bazelon, Law, Morality, and Citdt Liberties, 12
U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 13, 28 (1964).
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B.
In the Commentary on §2.02, the draftsmen say:
There appear to be no compelling constitu-
tional objections to an authority to stop per-
sons briefly for purposes of criminal investi-
gation. In the single case that squarely raised
before the Supreme Court the issue of the
constitutionality of such an exercise of power,
Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), the
Court declined to decide the question. (p 94.)
In a footnote to this passage, it is said:
Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959),
is not authoritative, since the government ex-
plicitly conceded that an arrest was made at
the moment the car in which the defendants
were traveling was stopped by FBI agents,
and sought only to argue that the information
in possession of the agents justified the arrest.
The Court held that an arrest on such informa-
tion was illegal, a conclusion from which this
Code does not differ.
Speaking gently, I say this is an unwarranted
denigration of the Henry case. The opinion of the
Court, written by Mr. Justice Douglas, is devoted
to the issue of arrest, specifically the circumstances
in which an arrest without a warrant validly may
be made.
The statutory authority of FBI officers and
agents to make felony arrests without a war-
rant is restricted to offenses committed "in
their presence" or to instances where they have
"reasonable grounds to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed or is commit-
ting" a felony. 18 USC §3052. The statute
states the constitutional standard, for it is the
command of the Fourth Amendment that no
warrants for either searches or arrests shall
issue except "upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized."
That philosophy [in opposition to general
warrants] later was reflected in the Fourth
Amendment. And as the early American de-
cisions both before and immediately after its
adoption show, common rumor or report, sus-
picion, or even "strong reason to suspect" was
not adequate to support a warrant for arrest."
Later in the opinion appears the discussion of
21361 U.S. 98, 100, 101.
the government's concession that the stopping of
defendants' automobile was an arrest:
The prosecution conceded below, and ad-
heres to the concession here, that the arrest
took place when the federal agents stopped
the car. That is our view on the facts of this
particular case. When the officers interrupted
the two nen and restricted their liberty of move-
ment, the arrest, for purposes of this case, was
complete. It is, therefore, necessary to deter-
mine whether at or before that time they had
reasonable cause to believe that a crime had
been committed. (Emphasis added.)"2
The government conceded that an arrest had
taken place, and the Court agreed but went on to
identify the elements of the arrest, namely, the
interruption of the two men and the restriction of
their liberty of movement. If anyone doubts that
the Court held that the stoppage of the car was an
arrest, he should refer to the persuasive interpreta-
tion of the Court's holding in the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Clark, with whom the Chief Justice
joined: "The Court seems to say that the mere
stopping of the car amounted to an arrest of the
petitioner. I cannot agree.' '2
This, then, is the case which the draftsmen dis-
missed in a footnote as "not authoritative". Yet,
until the Court itself reconsiders the issue, Henry
means to me that police interruption of a citizen's
progress and restriction of his liberty of movement
constitutes an arrest within the purview of the
fourth amendment's ban against unreasonable
seizures of our citizens' persons, the validity of
which must be judged by the fourth amendment's
requirement of probable cause, not by a standard
of mere suspicion. Since §2.02 permits an officer to
restrict a citizen's liberty of movement upon sus-
picion, it is small wonder that the draftsmen, de-
ciding, in this instance, at least, that discreet
silence is better than untenable distinguishment,
relegated Henry to a cryptic footnote.
The draftsmen further comment:
Some authority to interfere with liberty on
less than reasonable cause has been explicitly
recognized even in the absence of statute by
the courts in a number of jurisdictions, includ-
ing one Federal Court of Appeals. (p. 93.)
This statement is buttressed by a footnote wherein
this reference occurs:
United States v. Vita, 294 F. 2d 524, 529-30
22361 U.S. at 103.
23 Id. at 106.
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(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 823 (1962)
('The rule [of Federal R. Crim. Proc. 5(a)]
does not apply to a case in which federal offi-
cers detain a suspect for a short and reasonable
period in order to question him.').
But the quoted material is dictum, pure and simple,
and, at the very least, of questionable validity at
that. Judge Lumbard's opinion, speaking for two
members of the three-judge panel, stated:
Moreover, we find ample support for the
trial judge's finding that Vita was not under
detention during his questioning between the
time of his arrival at F.B.I. headquarters at
about 10:25 a. m. and his formal arrest at
6:52 p. in., following his confession .... We
find no reason not to accept the trial judge's
conclusion that Vita's presence prior to his
arrest was not coerced.24
Judge Lumbard then went on gratuitously to dis-
cuss what would have been the situation had Vita
not voluntarily cooperated with the officers. It was
this discussion which prompted Judge Waterman's
eminently correct concurrence:
... [Tihough I most assuredly concur in af-
firming Vita's conviction, I wish to make it
clear that I disassociate myself from concur-
ring in asiy portion of the opinion in which,
arquendo, as an alternative ground to support
an affirmance, it is sought to solve in vacuo
the rights of a hypothetical Vita, unwilling to




I submit that it is Vita, and not Henry, which de-
serves to be called "not authoritative" for the
proposition for which it is cited.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
sitting en bana, more carefully considered the defi-
nition of "arrest" in Coleman v. United States,
26
than did the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Vita. The court in Coleman held that the jury
had been instructed properly as to what consti-
tutes an arrest, and quoted the following, with
approval, from Long v. Ansell:"
"Thus it appears that the word 'arrest' has
a well-defined meaning. There must be some
detention of the person to constitute arrest. This
of course would mean any arrest made or de-
24 294 F.2d at 528, 529.25 Id. at 535.
26295 F.2d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 813 (1962).
27 63 D.C. App. 68, 71, 69 F2d 386 (1934), affirmed
293 U.S. 76 (1934). Long was a civil case involving an
attempt to serve a United States Senator with process.
tention in a criminal proceeding... . 'An arrest
is the seizing of a person and detaining him in
the custody of the law.' From these authori-
ties, it may be concluded, we think, that the
term arrest may be applied to any case where
a person is taken into custody or restrained of
his full liberty, or where the detention of a per-
son in custody is continued for even a short
period of time. People [ex rel. Taranto] v.
Erlanger (D.C.) 132 F. 883."2
Under the definition approved in Coleman, a stop
and frisk would be an arrest and, if made on sus-
picion only and not on probable cause, it would be
illegal.
Other cases relied upon by the draftsmen are no
more persuasive than Vita's dictum. In State v.
Goss,n the Alaska court attempted to distinguish
Henry on the ground that under the statute law of
Alaska, "An arrest does not take place ... until a
person has been taken into custody in order that
he may be held for the commission of a crime."
The Alaska court presumed, erroneously in my
view, that the states may take operative facts
which would constitute an illegal arrest under the
fourth amendment as construed by the Supreme
Court in Henry, and by labeling those facts other
than an arrest make legal the subsequent pro-
ceedings.
The issue was considered by Mr. Justice Traynor
in People v. Mickelson,30 also relied upon by the
draftsmen. He there stated that "A state rule
governing police procedure is not unconstitutional
merely because it permits conduct in which a fed-
eral officer may not lawfully engage" and con-
cluded: "We do not believe our rule permitting
temporary detention for questioning conflicts with
the Fourth Amendment." I cannot agree.
Justice Traynor predicted his conclusion upon
his belief that the Supreme Court's definition of
arrest in Henry was not "constitutionally com-
pelled" and in this I believe him to be wrong.
The fourth amendment bans unreasonable seizures
without defining either unreasonable or seizures.
The task of definition, perforce, becomes the
Court's, a task which it has steadily engaged in
2 295 F.2d at 563-564. Four judges of the nine-judge
panel concurred only in part, agreeing that the issue
of arrest was properly before the jury but disagreeing
that the prosecution was entitled to drop from the
ndictment a count charging defendant with first degree
murder.
29390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 859 (1964).
20 59 Cal.2d 448, 380 P.2d 658 (1964).
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performing since the fourth amendment's adoption,
on a case-by-case basis in the common law tradi-
tion, with reference to what is unreasonable. Not
until Henry v. United States, however, did the
Supreme Court undertake to define the fourth
amendment's use of the term seizure or, in com-
mon parlance as applied to the seizure of a person,
arrest. Whether "constitutionally compelled" to
do so, in view of the government's concession in
the Henry case that the arrest occurred when the
federal agents stopped the automobile in which
Henry was riding, the fact is that the Court did
define the term and in doing so it certainly did
nothing to suggest that state courts are left free
to apply a different definition of seizure or arrest
when a state police officer's conduct is challenged
on fourth amendment grounds.
justice Traynor argued in Mickelsoan that, ab-
sent a decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States establishing under the fourth amendment
rules governing the conduct of state as well as
federal police officers in making an arrest, that
state rules may be applied. Having read Henry v.
United States far more restrictively than do I, as
a decision not "constitutionally compelled", jus-
tice Traynor cites Johnson v. United States,3 and
United States v. Di Re, 2 in support of his conten-
tion that reference may be made to state law to
determine whether the police conduct considered
in Mickelson constituted an arrest. If my reading
of Henry is correct, however, then certainly Elkins
v. United States33 a case justice Traynor merely
cites and limits to its peculiar facts, disipates the
weight of Johnson and Di Re marshalled in sup-
port of Mickelson. So does Ker v. California,
14
decided just one month after Mickelson. In Elkins,
the Supreme Court said:
We hold that evidence obtained by state
officers during a search which, if conducted
by federal officers, would have violated the
defendant's immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment is inadmissible over the defend-
ant's timely objection in a federal criminal
trial. In determining whether there has been
an unreasonable search and seizure by state
officers, a federal court must make an inde-
pendent inquiry, whether or not there has been
such an inquiry by a state court, and irrespec-
31333 U.S. 10 (1948).
2332 U.S. 581 (1948).
3 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
34374 U.S. 23 (1963).
tive of how any such inquiry may have turned
out. The test is one of federal law, neither
enlarged by what one state court may have
countenanced, nor diminished by what an-
other may have colorably suppressed.35
The right to be free of unreasonable search and
seizure is secured by the federal constitution and
is binding upon the states. An arrest is a seizure,
as the draftsmen concede. If the validity of a
citizen's arrest is to be determined by whether
what was done to him constitutes an arrest within
the local definition of the term, the scope of a
citizen's protection under the fourth amendment
would vary according to the jurisdiction in which
he finds himself. But, the Court stated in Elkins,
"The test [as to whether a search and seizure are
unreasonable] is one of federal law, neither en-
larged by what one state court may have counten-
anced, nor diminished by what another may color-
ably have suppressed."
In Ker v. California, the decision annpunced
one month after justice Traynor's decision in
Mickelson, the Supreme Court said:
We reiterate that the reasonableness of a
search is in the first instance a substantive de-
termination to be made by the trial court from
the facts and circumstances of the case and
in the light of the "fundamental criteria", laid
down by the Fourth Amendment and in opin-
ions of this Court applying that Amendment.
Findings of reasonableness, of course, are re-
spected only insofar as consistent with federal
constitutional guarantees. As we have stated
above and in other cases involving federal
constitutional rights, findings of state cdurts
are by no means insulated against examination
here .... While this Court does not sit as in
nisi prius to appraise contradictory factual
questions, it will, where necessary to the de-
termination of constitutional rights, make an
independent examination of the facts, the
findings, and the record so that it can deter-
mine for itself whether in the decision as to
reasonableness the fundamental-i.e., consti-
tutional-criteria established by this Court
have been respected3 6
I see no justification in logic nor in law to insist
upon judicial uniformity in determining reason-
ableness of a seizure while permitting the states to
define variously just what it is that constitutes a
35Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-224,
(1960).
"6 374 U.S. at 33-34.
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seizure or an arrest which must meet the uniform
federal standard, "constitutionally compelled", of
reasonableness. I submit that in reaching its de-
cision in Henry v. United States, the Supreme
Court saw no such justification either.
In the light of all this, Johnson and Di Re are
of little precedential worth in support of the
Mickelson decision. However, we might profitably
note the Supreme Court's answer in Di Re to the
prosecution's argument that arrests upon suspi-
cion are necessary to effective law enforcement, an
argument advanced now by the draftsmen in
favor of their proposals:
We meet in this case, as in many, the appeal
to necessity. It is said that if such arrests and
searches cannot be made, law enforcement
will be more difficult and uncertain. But the
forefathers, after consulting the lessons of
history, designed our Constitution to place
obstacles in the way of a too permeating police
surveillance, which they seemed to think was
a greater danger to a free people than the es-
cape of some criminals from punishment. Tak-
ing the law as it has been given to us, this
arrest and search were beyond the lawful
authority of those who executed them. The
conviction based on evidence so obtained can-
not stand3 7
The verbal juggling in which the draftsmen en-
gaged in saying that a stop is not an arrest also is
reflected in People v. Rivera.38 That case was cited
by the draftsmen in support of their thesis that
the police have a right forcibly to detain and
question suspicious persons. In Rivera, the court
decided that a frisk was not a search, and so held
admissible in evidence a weapon found in the
course of a stop and frisk.
The facts of the Rivera case occurred before the
effective date of the present New York stop and
frisk law. The police stopped defendant because he
acted suspiciously 3 9 Without discussion the Court
concluded:
The stopping of the indivudual to inquire
is not an arrest and the ground upon which the
332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
14 N.Y. 2d 441, 201 N.E. 2d 32 (1964).
3 The suspicious circumstances were:
"On May 25, 1962 at 1:30 in the morning, Detec-
tive Bennett and two other detectives were on motor
patrol near 7th Street and Avenue C in Manhattan.
All were in plain clothes; the car was unmarked. De-
tective Bennett observed two men for about five min-
utes. They 'walked up in front, outside a bar and grill,
stopped, looked in the window, continued to walk a
few steps, came back, and looked in the window again'.
"The detective further testified: 'At that time the
police may make the inquiry may be less in-
criminating than the ground for an arrest for
a crime known to have been committed.
40
Having already labeled as specious the assertion
that an enforced detention of a citizen by police is
something other than an arrest, let us turn to the
manner in which the New York court decided that
a frisk is not a search:
The frisk as it is described in the actual
events that occurred in this case, however, and
as it is generally understood in police usage,
is a contact or patting of the outer clothing of
a person to detect by the sense of touch if a
concealed weapon is being carried.
It is something of an invasion of privacy;
but so is the stopping of the person on the
street in the first place something of an in-
vasion of privacy. The frisk is less such inva-
sion in degree than an initial full search of the
person would be. It ought to be distinguish-
able also on pragmatic grounds from the
degree of constitutional protection that would
surround a full-blown search of the person.
4'
justice Fuld, in dissent, commented thusly:
This is nothing but an exercise in semantics;
a search by any other name is still a search.
Viewed in the perspective of constitutionally
protected interests, a police tactic--call it a
search or, more euphemistically, a "frisk"-
which leads to discovery of a gun in an indi-
vidual's pocket by trespassing on his person
is indisputably an invasion of privacy. A
"frisk" is a species of search and, in point of
fact, both decisions and dictionaries so define
it....
For myself, I am not persuaded that a frisk
is as slight an affront to privacy and liberty
as my brethren make it out to be. Free men
should no more be subject to having the police
run their hands over their pockets than
through them. Neither the Fourth Amend-
ment nor, for that matter, the common law of
tort distinguishes, as does the majority, be-
tween a cursory search and a more elaborate
one. In both instances, it is the slightest touch-
ing which is condemned, and the reason for
this is that the insult to individuality, to in-
defendant looked in my direction, towards the car,
said something to his friend, and they both started
walking rapidly north on Avenue C.' He described the
area as a neighborhood in which 'We have quite a bit
of crime... Muggings, stick-ups, assaults, larcenies,
burglaries'." (201 N.E. 2d at 33.)40 Id. at 34.41Id. at 35.
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dividual liberty, is as grave and as objection-
able in the one case as in the other.4
Indicative of the lack of thoughtful considera-
tion given the constitutional issues involved is the
majority's statement that "[a full-blown search of
the person] would u4sually require sufficient evi-
dence of a committed crime to justify an arrest or
be an incident to a lawful arrest." (Emphasis
added.) The qualification "usually" is particularly
distressing, since I know of no exceptions to the
rule. It is from such innocuous beginning that
spring the tentacles of incipient totalitarianism. In
that light one should refer to People v. Pugach,4
wherein the New York Court of Appeals held that
a search upon suspicion of defendant's brief case
was not a search but a "frisk" and so permissible.
The court commented: "Under all the circum-
stances the inclusion of the brief case in the 'frisk'
was not so unreasonable as to be constitutionally
illegal." (Emphasis added.) I had always believed
that an unreasonable search was per se illegal;
now, however, we are told, apparently that there
are degrees of unreasonableness, and that a search
must be "so" unreasonable, not just "unreason-
able" before it is invalid.
Other cases from various states are cited by the
draftsmen in support of their assertion that "au-
thority to interfere with liberty on less than reason-
able cause has been explicitly recognized even in
the absence of statute". (p 93.) None merits dis-
cussion; the issue was stated and decided in each,
ipse dixit, even in circumstances suggesting that
the interference with defendant's liberty may not
have been coerced."
4Id. at 37.
4 15 N.Y. 2d 65, 204 N.E. 2d 176 (1965).
44 State v. Hatfield, 122 W.Va. 424, 164 S.E. 518
(1932); State v. Zupan, 155 Wash. 80, 283 P. 671 (1929);
People v. Faginkrantz, 21 111.2d 75, 171 N.E. 2d 5
(1960); and People v. Henneman, 367 ]ll. 151, 10
N.E. 2d 649 (1937).
The only exception to the statement in the text is
the opinion of Judge Irvin R. Kaufman, then a federal
district judge, in United States v. Bonanno (S.D. N.Y.
1960), 180 F. Supp. 71, rev'd for insufficiency of evi-
dence sub norn. Bufalino v. United States, 285 F.2d
408 (2d Cir. 1960). The case arose out of the prosecu-
tion of those who attended the celebrated "Apalachin
Conference". Judge Kaufman discussed the issue
whether one stopped for questioning is arrested, but his
negative conclusion is unpersuasive. For example, one
of the reasons he gave for deciding that a field inter-
rogation is not an arrest is that a layman "would not
be likely to describe situations where he had been
stopped by a police officer, or situations where his car
had been stopped, or even situations where his ques-
tioning has been continued at a police station, as ar-
rests." (180 F. Supp. at 78.) He also appears to dis-
tinguish the Henry case on the ground that in the case
before him there was not "probable cause for an arrest
C.
Finally, the draftsmen cite five states which
have statutory provisions authorizing some form
of stop and frisk, and note that "such provisions
have antecedents in statutes and doctrines going
back to the thirteenth century," with a supporting
footnote referring to, inter alia, the Statute of
Winchester.45 It is to be hoped that the draftsmen
do not advocate the adoption of that statute in its
full vigor, for it instructed a town's watchmen
that "if any stranger do pass by them, he shall be
arrested until morning; and if no suspicion be
found, he shall go quit; and if they find cause of
suspicion, they shall forthwith deliver him to the
sheriff...." The watchmen, then, need not even
have suspected to arrest; the mere fact that one
was a stranger abroad authorized detention.
It is not clear to me what precedential worth
this statute merits, in the context of the United
States Constitution and the fourth amendment
thereto. The fact that in the thirteenth century a
statute authorized an arrest, that is, a seizure of
the person, without probable cause or even sus-
picion, is not persuasive that such a seizure may
be made in the twentieth century without violating
the requiremeits of the fourth amendment that,
absent a warrant, there be probable cause before
a valid arrest can be made.
I suspect that the draftsmen were so taken by
the appearance in the same statute of "arrest" and
"suspicion" that they simply could not resist citing
it as authority for permitting arrests upon mere
suspicion. If that be so, they need not have con-
fined themselves to the Statute of Winchester. As
authority for arrests upon suspicion they could,
for example, have cited the Statute De Haeretico
Comburendo,46 which provided that anyone "sus-
pected" of preaching without a license might be
"arrested" and, if found guilty, "before the people
in an high place.., be burnt".
But the Statute of Winchester is interesting for
another reason: it serves to document that the
"crime crisis" and public indifference thereto is not
a latter-day phenomenon. The Statute begins:
FORASMUCH as from day to day, robber-
ies, murders, and arsons be more often used
than they have been heretofore, and felons
cannot be attainted by the oath of jurors which
for purposes of seizure when the cars were stopped at
the checkpoint" and concluded therefrom that there
was no arrest and that, therefore, stopping of the cars
was not illegal. 180 F. Supp. at 85.
4113 Edw. 1 c. 4 (1285).
46 2 Henry 4 (1401).
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had rather suffer felonies done to strangers to
pass without pain, than to indite the offenders
of whom great part be people of the same
country....
The Statute of Winchester apparently was not
overly effective, for we find in 4 Henry 8 c. 2
(1512), dealing with the denial of benefit of clergy
to murderers, the following language:
WHEREAS robberies, murders and felonies
daily increase more and more, and are com-
mitted and done in more heinous, open and
detestable wise than hath been often seen in
times past, and the persons so offending little
regard the punishment thereof by the course
of the common law nor by reason of any
statute heretofore made....
I noted earlier Judge Bazelon's conclusion that
the tentacles of incipient totalitarianism are not
content to strangle only the "undesirable" element
upon whom they are unleashed, but eventually
will seek out "respectable" citizens also. The his-
tory of the Court of Star Chamber proves the
truth of this statement. One of the reasons given
for the establishment of that court in 1487 was
"the increase of murders, robberies, perjuries, and
unsureties of all men living and the losses of their
lands and goods, to the great displeasure of Al-
mighty God .... ,, 47 The extraordinary departure
from the usual course of the law which this statute
authorized was thought necessary because justice
could not be had otherwise. The court was, then,
designed as a means of benefiting the citizen by
checking lawless elements. Yet in 1641 we find on
the statute books an "Act for the Abolition of the
Court of Star Chamber" in which the citizens of
the realm thus succinctly distill the results of the
experiment:
The proceedings, censures and decrees of
that Court have by experience been found to
be an intolerable burden to the subjects, and
the means to introduce an arbitrary power and
government .... 48
While discussing these early statutes one might
note that the theory that felons are encouraged to
commit crimes by judicial and administrative
decisions which allegedly "coddle criminals" is not
47 3 Henry 7 c. 1 (1487).
48 16 Charles 1 c. 10. The act of 1487 was commonly
regarded as establishing the Star Chamber, particu-
larly since the statutute roll shows its title as Pro
Camera Stdlata, and the abolishment act of 1641
specifically refers to the act of 1487. See, however, the
discussion in TASwELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CON-
STITUTIONAL HisroaY 254, n. (u) (Plucknett ed.).
a new one, either. Thus in the Statute of North-
ampton, we find:
Whereas offenders have been greatly en-
couraged, because that charters of pardon
have been so easily granted in times past, of
manslaughters, robberies, felonies, and other
trespasses against the peace; it is ordained and
enacted, that such charter shall not be
granted, but only where the king may do it
by his oath, that is to say, where a man slayeth
another in his own defence, or by misfor-
tune .... 49
CoNcLusION
The Supreme Court's present docket of argued
but undecided criminal cases considered, m the
rather precipitous haste to publish the tentative
draft of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Pro-
cedures suggests to me that its sponsors may be
seeking thereby to be heard in the chambers of the
Justices as well as in the councils of the American
Law Institute. As one whose official duties re-
cently have included the obligation of decision in
a spate of reapportionment cases, involving both
state and local legislative bodies, I am acquainted
with the familiar and well developed practice of
extrajudicial scholarship pendente lite. Ethical con-
siderations aside, it will be interesting to observe
what use, if any, the Justices make of the drafts-
men's efforts.
This much, however, can be said of those efforts,
even by one such as I who has been somewhat
critical of them: The tentative draft's field inter-
rogation section offers all of us an opportunity,
indeed a challenge, to examine stop and frisk pro-
posals in a more scholarly atmosphere than that
which to date has permeated the current debate
over crime and its suppression. Only when we are
prepared to strip away the emotional and analysis-
crippling rhetoric of the current debate will we be
enabled to discuss rationally and, hopefully, pro-
ductively, the merits of such proposals. And only
then can we direct our attention, as we must, to
other available weapons against the spectre of in-
creasing crime which do not require that we tamper
with the most fundamental of our constitutional
rights as citizens, our right to be free.
49 3 Edw. 3 (1328). For a discussion of similar charges
raised sporadically throughout the first half of the
present century, see Kamisar, When The Cops Were
Not Handcuffed, The New York Times Magazine,
November 7, 1965, p. 34.
50 See Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).
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Confessions in Fdony Prosecutions for the Year of 1961 as Compared to January 20, 1965 Through -
October 31, 1965
Unlawjul Driving Away Auto and Possession of
Stolen Motor Vehicle
1961 Percentage 1-20-65 to pe
10-31-6 ercentag.
Prosecutions 392 - 534 -
Convictions 270 68.9 384 71.9
Pending 0 - 113 21.2
Confessions 233 59.4 345 64.6
Confessions
Essential 72 18.4 99 18.5
In the majority of UDAA prosecutions the arresting
officer's testimony made the confession supplementary.
Confession was of primary importance in cases charg-
ing Possession of Stolen Motor Vehicle where guilty
knowledge is necessary element.
Uttering & Publishing and Larceny over
8100.00 (Shoplifting)
1961 Percentage 1-20-65 to Percentage10-31-65
Prosecutions 337 - 223 -
Convictions 331 98.2 128 57.4
Pending 0 - 95 42.6
Confessions 241 71.5 144 64.6
Confessions
Essential 2 .06 1 .05
It is the policy of the Wayne County Prosecutor's
Office not to issue warrants in Uttering & Publishing
Cases on confessions alone, but on the identification
of defendant by complainant. Confessions shown as
essential in above figures were the result of reverse
show-ups where the defendant identified the com-
plainant.
Narcotic violations
1961 Percentage 1-20-65 to Percentage10-31-5 g
Prosecutions 240 - 205 -
Convictions 197 82.1 69 33.7
Pending 3 1.3 119 59.0
Confessions 124 51.7 107 52.2-
Confessions were not essential in any court case.
Kidnappzng-Extorticn-Arson-Larceny by Trick
1961 Percentage 106 Percentage
Prosecutions 24 - 51 -
Convictions 9 37.5 25 49.0
Pending 0 - 24 47.1
Confessions 7 29.2 16 31.4
Confessions
Essential 3 12.5 0 -
Robberies
1961 Percentage 1-20-65 to Percentage10-31-65
Prosecutions 181 - 112 -
Convictions 170 93.9 56 50.0
Pending - - 54 48.2
Confessions 148 81.8 83 74.1
Confessions
Essential 47 26.0 29 25.9
Homicide Cases Burglaries
1-20-65 to
1961 Percentage 10_31_ Percentage
Prosecutions 115 - 107 -
Convictions 105 91.3 36 33.6
Pending 0 - 68 63.6
Confessions 61 53.0 60 56.1
Confessions
Essential 24 20.9 10 9.3
1961 Percentage 120-65 to Percentage10-31-65
Prosecutions 62 - 37 -
Convictions 60 96.8 27 73.0
Pending 0 - 8 21.6
Confessions 40 64.5 12 32.4
Confessions
Essential 33 53.2 9 24.3
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Carrying Concealed Weapons--Possession of Burglar




Prosecutions 20 - 26 -
Convictions 18 90.0 14 53.8
Pending 0 - 13 50.0
Confessions 7 35.0 8 30.8
Confessions
Essential 8 40.0 5 19.2
Forcible Rape
1961 Percentage 1-20-65 toPercentage10_31_-65 Pretg
Prosecutions 74 - 63 -
Convictions 56 75.7 29 46.0
Pending - - 25 39.6
Confessions 18 24.3 12 19.0
Confessions
Essential 0 - 0 -
It is the policy of the Wayne County Prosecutor's




Prosecutions 1445 - 1358 -
Convictions 1216 84.2 768 56.6
Pending 3 .2 519 38.2
Confessions 879 60.8 787 58.0
Confessions
Essential 189 13.1 153 11.3
The above figures are felony prosecutions handled
by the Specialized Bureaus of the Criminal Investiga-
tion Division during the periods specified.
VINCENT W. PIERSANTE
Chief of Detectives
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